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Book Reviews
Problems in the Law of Contracts. By Henry Winthrop Ballantine,
Professor of Law in the University of Wisconsin. Lawyers' CoOperative Publishing Co., Rochester, N. Y. i915. pp. 1.+363.
This book contains about 65o cases, presented hypothetically,
which are based upon decided cases, or are taken from examination
questions given at various leading law schools. To each problem is
appended a reference note which cites cases, text-books, and periodical articles and notes, where there will be found a discussion of the
points involved in, or germane to, the problem. The compilation
has been prepared as a stimulant to profitable colloquy in the class
room; as affording case material for the preparation of briefs; and
as a medium for review of the subject. The book should prove a
specially valuable complement to lectures and text-books where these
means of instruction are eipployed. It would seem, however, that
where case books furnish the material for study, there might be difficulty in finding time to make systematic use of the problems and referencenotes brought togetherinthisbook. The compiler, at the recent
annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools, tendered an answer to this objection by a plea for a still greater intensive training in legal reasoning than is afforded by the use of case
books, and expressed the opinion that "a month of every course ought
to be given to original constructive work" of the sort for which material is presented in his compilation, and thus "carry out very much
more the true idea and theory of the case system and make our methods of study less mechanical and more dynamic."
The book is well adapted to the purpose intended. The problems
selected are provocative of thought and discussion. The reference
notes, on the whole, point to the most helpful, including the most recent information and arguments, although for some unexplained
reason there are no references made to that finest example of compact
and relentless reasoning on the problems of contract, Professor LangdeHl's "Summary of the Law of Contracts."
Edwin II. Woodruff.
Cases on the Law of Public Service. By Charles K. Burdick, Professor of Law in the Cornell University College of Law. Boston:
Little, Brown & Co. 1916. pp. XIII, 544.
Undoubtedly the social philosophy behind American constitutional
limitations by which we have attempted to create a sphere of liberty
within which the individual shall be immune from governmental
control is that the interests of society as a whole will thereby be promoted; constitutional liberty for the individual has been viewed as
an important social interest. While our social philosophy seems
shifting somewhat, the forces that make dominant public opinion are
by no means ready to abandon the attempt and have merely come to
attach greater significance to counter social interests. In short we
have only come to view individual freedom as unattainable to that
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degree, and undesirable inthat degree that we set out to establish it.
There is a shift of emphasis. In the balancing of individual liberty
as a social interest against other social interests the latter are being
appreciated more highly, the former is not abandoned.
The conflict ranges widely; in the field of the law governing business or economic endeavor we have only one manifestation. With
us, under our system of constitutional limitations, the age-old problem of determining what businesses or callings should be subjected
to greater regulation in the interest of society and what should be
left relatively free becomes :--which of them may be more regulated
and which must be left relatively unregulated. It is intolerable to
us that the men who compose for the time being our legislatures or
even our courts should determine this to suit their personal opinions.
The former we restrain by some vague constitutional clauses, and the
latter are under the restraint of interpreting these clauses consistently, perhaps we cannot say, in accordafnce with law, because in the
realm of constitutional interpretation it is often difficult to predicate
the existence of law prior to decision, but at least so to interpret them
as to evolve a body of law, a body of rules of uniform and equal application. In this sense the doctrine of stare decisis is but a phase of
government by law instead of by men.
Professor Burdick has collected in the first eighty-six pages of his
case book all of the more valuable material bearing upon this problem. A careful study of this material by the student whether in the
law school or on the bench will give a definite comprehension of the
extent to which certainty has been attained by the courts in the rules
of law so far evolved for determining the division of businesses between the two classes and also a definite comprehension of the degree
of uncertainty which still exists. Little will be left to be learned
about the present state of the law by a more exhaustive study; though
the student will emerge with an eagerness to verify his opinions as to
the trend of judicial thought by observing subsequent decisions as
they are rendered.
While much uncertainty still exists as to what businesses may be
considered in the class subject to greater regulation, the class is already numerous and there is more definiteness as to the rules to which
a business within the class is subjected. The remainder of the volume is devoted to these rules, both common law and statutory. These
privately owned and operated businesses subject to the greater regulation we have, for want of a better name, come to call the public
services, and the rules of regulation, the law of public service. We
could have distinguished better these businesses from public service
proper rendered by governmental. officers and institutions, and taken
account of the private element in them, by styling them quasi-public businesses; and spoken- of the law of quasi-public service; .but
perhaps it is too late.
In Chapter II material is included for adequate study of the service required to be rendered by typical quasi-public servants, whom
they must serve, and excuses for failure to serve. Under the caption, "The Right of Public Service Companies to Serve Themselves"
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is treated, so far as courts and legislatures have given meagre material, the question whether a quasi-public servant may also carry on a
purely private additional business in connection with his public business and so operate the two that service in his public capacity rendered to himself in his private capacity will advantage him against
his competitors in the latter capacity. A tendency is appearing to"
require the public servant to be exclusively such.
Chapter III deals with the limits within which a quasi-public servant may himself make regulations of his service or fix the conditions
upon which he will render service.
Chapter IV presents the topic of rate regulation, rates fixed by the
servant himself, the power of the government to fix rates, the limits
on the latter power and the elements of a valid rate: herein, Operating Expenses and Maintenance, the Capital upon which a Return
should be Earned and what Rate of Return should be allowed. The
remaining Chapters, V, VI and VII, treat respectivelyof Discrinination, Duty to Furnish Adequate Facilities and Withdrawal from
Public Service. In the appendix are provided the Federal Act to
Regulate Commerce as amended to date and the Elkins Act.
In its 479 pages, exclusive of the appendix, this case book with its
careful selection of cases, wise discrimination in eliminating less important portions of long opinions, occasional pertinent excerpts from
other opinions (appended in foot-notes), is a very successful compromise between that type which puts the student to read with relative
unprofitableness long opinions printed in extenso and that other extreme which, by its drastic pruning of opinions, explanatory captions
and footnotes, leaves little for the student to think out for himself.
The present case book, while achieving a fair measure of exhaustiveness of the subject by its compactness, yet preserves to an equal degree what to the reviewer is indispensable to a good case book, the
feature of being a book of source material, with cases not so "edited"
as to exclude all but the editor's opinion of what the cases stand for.
The rule of reasonableness which pervades the law of public service
has'been applied by the editor in making this happy compromise.
D. 0. McGovney.
The Ancient Hebrew Law of Homicide. By Mayer Sulzberger.
Philadelphia: Julius H. Greenstone. 1915.
This volume contains five lectures delivered before the Dropsie
College of Hebrew and Cognate Learning in 1913 by Judge Sulzberger. They belong to a series of studies in Jewish Jurisprudence
and Institutes of Government. In x91o the eminent jurist published
the first of these under the title "The Am Haaretz-the Ancient
Hebrew Parliament." The second, on "The Polity of the Ancient
Hebrews," appeared in 1912. Like its predecessors, the present
contribution is characterized by a thorough familiarity with the
primary sources, a firm grasp on fundamental principles and a wide
acquaintance with the general development of law, great independence
of thought, and a remarkably lucid manner of presentation. The
author's knowledge of Hebrew and of law renders it possible for him to
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elucidate the meaning of many terms hitherto misunderstood and to
remove some widely held, but erroneous, impressions concerning legal
procedure and administration of justice among the ancient Hebrews.
Judge Sulzberger's conclusions in regard to the development of the
law of homicide in ancient Israel and Judah are strikingly original.
According to his view, the Hebrews in Egypt had an oral law which,
to a considerable extent, was incorporated in the subsequently written
law. When they entered Palestine, c. 128o B. C., they brought with
them the Torah, or Law. The Canaanites had cruel gods and cruel
laws, despotism prevailed, slavery was the cornerstone of their institutions. The invading Hebrews, on the other hand, held that freedom
was the true basis of the state, and law and justice its purpose. In
their scheme despotism had no place. The chiefs of the state could
not hold office without the assent of the people, nor could they rule by
mere will or caprice, but only by law. In the period of the Judges the
'elders of the city' in the various cantons of the federation failed to
administer the Hebrew law whose letter and spirit were hostile to the
practice of wergild common among the Canaanites. Under the vendetta law the homicide had to pay a certain amount to the goel, or
'avenger,' of the bereaved family, failing which the avenger could put
him to death. Motive and circumstances were not inquired into.
A killing by accident was not differentiated from deliberate assassination. Murder was not carefully distinguished from manslaughter.
There were indeed federal officets (Levites and priests) teaching the
law; but the 'elders of the city,' under Canaanitish influence, were
inclined to favor the wergild, and the right of asylum at the
sanctuaries was recognized.
Solomon determined to abolish this system, and to enforce the
Exodus statute. He therefore introduced the new remedies found
chiefly in Deuteronomy. This Deuteronomic reform involved the
assumption by the state of exclusive jurisdiction over all cases of
homicide, the compulsory duty of the elders of the city to entrust the
execution to a newly created federal officer for each canton, the goel
ha-dam, or 'blood-avenger,' the abolition of sanctuary for homicide,
the establishment of six judicial districts, with one city in each to
which the homicide must go, the substitution of internment in a
separate city for wergild, and a marked change in the law of evidence
by which the testimony of one witness only became incompetent to
convict. The 'city of refuge,' instituted by Solomon, was really a
'city of confinement' where the manslayer was interned, according to
Numbers xxxv, 28 during the life-time of the contemporary highpriest. This institution existed only about one century. For
Jehoshaphat, c. 85o B. C. established a federal court in every canton,
each of which had executive officers to execute the judgments. He
sent princes into every comer of the land, with legal experts (Levites
and priests) to reinforce their statesmanlike arguments with the statement of the principles and practices of the Hebrew law, carrying with
them 'the book of the law of Yahwe.' He appointed judges in all the
cities of Judah, and established a supreme court, which was solely an
appellate court, in Jerusalem. This put an end to the cities of refuge
and practically removed the last remnant of the lex talionis.

NOTES AND COMMENT
This highly ingenious hypothesis challenges attention, and is
worthy of most serious consideration. If it fails to command a ready
aquiescence, it is not necessarily because it runs counter to inherited
opinions. Historians rightly insist upon a careful and critical
examination of the sources. It is evident that Judge Sulzberger
neither accepts the orthodox Jewish view that Moses wrote the Pentateuch nor the theory as to the composition and date of this work
dominant among scholars to-day. The present reviewer has no fault
to find in principle with this position, seeing that many years of study
and reflection have led him to abandon the current system of critical
analysis as well as the tradition of Mosaic authorship. But it is to be
regretted that the author did not indicate more clearly such results as
he may have reached in regard to the extent and probable date of the
different strata in the Pentateuch. He sometimes speaks as though
he held the Law to have been in existence before the Hebrew invasion
of Canaan; elsewhere he intimates that certain laws found in Deuteronomy were innovations in the time of Solomon; and he strongly
maintains, on the basis of a narrative in 2 Chron. xvi-xix, that the
whole process which he outlines was completed in 85o B.C. There
is a certain vagueness as to the character and date assigned by the
author to his documents that disturbs the reader. What evidence is
there that the invading Hebrews possessed any part of the Pentateuch
in writing or in the form of oral tradition? How can the account in
2 Kings xxii-xxiii of the discovery of a law absolutely unknown before
Josiah's time, and the history recorded in Judges, Samuel, and Kings
harmonizing with this, be explained on the assumption that Solomon
knew Deuteronomy? How is it possible to accept the account in
Chronicles concerning Jehoshaphat's reform without considering the
general trustworthiness of this work? A critical discussion of the
sources by the author of these suggestive studies is certainly a desideratum.
Hanmnurapi's Code may legitimately be used to show what the
common law of Palestine is likely to have been when the Hebrews
invaded the country. The distance in time is not quite so great as
the author assumes. We now know by astronomical calculations,
revealing the reliability of Berosus' dates for the first Babylonian
dynasty, that Hammurapi ruled from 2124 to 2o8i B. C., and the code
was promulgated in the latter part of his reign. In view of recent
discoveries it is probable that the biblical chronology is approximately
correct, and that the immigration of Hebrew tribes into Palestine
took place in the I 5th century, and not two hundred years later, as
some scholars maintain. The Tell el Amaxna and Boghazkeui tablets
indicate that the Babylonian influer - remained strong long after the
Egyptian conquest: and the dynasty to which Hammurapi belonged
was Amoritish. It is altogether natural to suppose that the nomadic
invaders reacted against many. customs and laws of Amorites and
Canaanites as well as that they unhesitatingly adopted many others.
But it may be seriously questioned whether the ethically less advanced
ideas in the Mosaic codes can at once be set down as Canaanitish or
Amoritish survivals, and whether particularly emphasized prohibi-
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tions must of necessity be directed against foreign rather than
native customs. In spite of the official correspondence between kings
and governors in the 15th and x4 th centuries, we know very little
about the social development in Palestine at this time. It would not
be strange, if conceptions and practices strongly entrenched among
nomads should have possessed a firmer hold upon the recent invaders
than upon those who had long ago settled down to agricultural and
urban life. The higher and the lower co-exist everywhere, regardless
of logical consistency. A frank acknowledgment of such possibilities
and facts is quite compatible with the highest consideration for the
peculiar genius of Israel.
Judge Sulzberger infers from the Code of Hammurapi that the
Babylonian state had no jurisdiction over homicide cases. The
absence of any section dealing distinctly with this class of crimes is
indeed peculiar, and the silence is capable of such an interpretation.
Yet, in view of the highly developed administrative machinery, the
existence of local courts and a supreme court of appeals in Babylon,
and the infliction of the death penalty or public scourging for various
crimes and torts, it is difficult to imagine that the government would
take no cognizance of the murder of e. g., a priest or an official, but
leave this entirely to the operation of the lex talionis. The emphasis
upon witnesses, in the plural, is so strong,that it does not seem possible
that conviction on the testimony of one witness only can have been
the accepted rule in the world influenced by this law. The distinction
between 'avenger' and 'blood avenger,' and the interpretation of the
latter as a federal sheriff are very doubtful, and a close connection
between the right of asylum in a sanctuary and thecities of refuge
still remains probable.
It is possible, however, that these searching investigations may
permanently modify our conceptions on some important points. If
vendetta law, revenge by family or clan, exhausts the meaning of the
lex talionis,it is important to realize that there seem to be indications
of the assumption by the state in Judah and Israel of jurisdiction in
homicide cases, and the consequent reduction and ultimate disappearance of private blood-feuds, even though it may be impossible to fix
chronologically the beginnings of this significant change. If the term
applies to the requital of injuries by like injuries, whether by private
parties or the state, it should be borne in mind that, while the principle was not abandoned, the growing refinement of manners and
morals made it less and less strictly followed, so that an eye was not
taken for an eye, or a tooth for a tooth, even though a life continued
to be taken for a life. It is not improbable that imprisonment was a
punitive measure regularly resorted to, or impossible that the phrase
'he shall be punished' referred to incarceration. The etymological
explanation which. transforms the cities of refuge to state prisons,
and does away with the familiar picture of the manslayer running a
race for his life with a blood-thirsty avenger in hot pursuit of him,
may be well founded. An internment of indefinite length in certain
designated cities in the case of a homicide, guiltless of deliberate
murder, is intrinsically probable. The limitation to the life-time of
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the high-priest, whether a part of the original text or a later addition,
would seem to show that the institution existed in the post-exilic period
when for the first time the state was ruled, so far as the internal
government was concerned, by high-priests. It is sincerely to be
hoped that the author may continue these interesting and thoughtprovoking studies.
Nathaniel Schmidt.
Trusts, Pools and Corporations. Revised Edition. By William Z.
Ripley. Boston. Ginn and Company. igi6. pp. 868.
The first edition of this book appeared in i9o5. It was announced
as "a deliberate attempt to apply the case system to the study of
economics." Inmy opinion this is not an altogether accurate description of the nature and purpose of the book. It will not enable the
reader to reach any clear-cut notion of the fundamental economic
principles involved in the various problems grouped together under
the head of the "corporation and trust problem," nor does it represent
an attempt to trace the development of such principles. But it does
bring together in convenient form a surprisingly large amount of
pertinent material upon the subjects which it treats. While it does
not point the way to conclusions, it brings the more important problems
connected with the public control of corporations and of industrial
combinations into clear relief, and for this reason, if for no other, it is
an invaluable aid to the student.
The book includes three classes of material: First, it contains concrete descriptions of the financial operations of typical pools and
trusts. Some of these accounts are by individual writers, some are
taken from reports of the United States Bureau of Corporations, and
some are excerpts from the record or from the briefs in important
cases. In the second place, Professor Ripley reprints a number of
important papers on such topics as" Trade Combinations at Common
Law" (by Professor Frank J. Goodnow) and "Corporate Promotion
and Finance in Germany" (by Ernest Schuster). Finally, the volume
contains the text of the Sherman Act of i8go and the amendatory
statutes of 1914, together with the opinions (often abbreviated) in
some of the more important cases under the Sherman Act. All this
makes a volume of nearly 900 pages, including 24 chapters, and 37
different items. Some of the older material, such as the accounts of
the Wire Nail Association of 1895-96, the description of the .United
States Steel Corporation's Bond Conversion, and the account of the
Michigan Salt Association, might have been omitted with advantage,
Other excerpts might have been pared down by judicious editing. I'
mention these points because the book as it stands is altogether too
large. It does not cover the field thoroughly or systematically
enough to take the place of a text-book, and my conviction, born of
experience, is that there is relatively little value in asking students to
read assignments in books like this unless there is time for their
thorough discussion in class. But the chief disadvantage of the book
is that it covers too broad a field. Its material on corporation
finance and on the economic aspects of the corporation (as a general
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form of business organization) is so scrappy and inadequate that it
might well have been omitted. The bulk of the contents of the book
relates to the problem of industrial combination. In this field
Professor Ripley's selections have been carefully made, and their
value to the reader is increased by the editor's generally illuminating
notes.
But I must dissent from Professor Ripley's statement that the
decision in the Standard Oil Company case marks "the entire conviction at last of the Supreme Court of the United States, that all was
not well with business as it had come to be conducted in America, but
that, nevertheless, the time had arrived to discriminate between
what was evil, deserving elimination, and that which was so inherently
sound and necessary as to merit the protection, nay even the encouragement, of the law." It is true that this interpretation of the
meaning of the Standard Oil decision was widely popularized at the
time, but more careful study of the opinion, as well as of the trend
of subsequent opinions by the federal courts, has shown that instead
of leaving wide scope for "judicial legislation," the Standard Oil
opinion established a more clear-cut and definite criterion of the
meaning and application of the Sherman Act than can be found in
any prior decision.
And I cannot sympathize with Professor Ripley's defense of the
Clayton Act,-a statute which in the opinion of almost all competent
students of the subject is bound to do more harm than good. But
these strictures relate in the main to minor points. Professor ipley's
attainiments in the field covered by this volume are well known, and
the book will in'no way diminish his already high reputation.
Allyn A. Young.
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